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THE CALCULATION OF PERIODIC
PAYMENTS FOR PERMANENT
DISABILITY
BY TERENCE G. ISON*
Methods of calculating benefits, particularly for permanent disability, remain a
serious problem for both private and government plans of disability insurance.
Professor Ison analyses some of the methods in use. His evaluation includes not
only the financial implications to recipients of alternative methods of calcula-
tion, but also the social costs and the probable effects on the physical and
mental health and the morale of claimants. His critique concludes by sug-
gesting a combination of two methods to provide the optimum solution to the
problems identified.
INTRODUCTION
The measurement of permanent partial disability has probably
been the most difficult topic in the area of compensation for disable-
ment. Indeed, the problems involved are so formidable that many sys-
tems of disability insurance, including policies offered by insurance
companies and the disability benefit under the Canada Pension Plan,
confine their benefits to cases of total disability. This topic is probably
also the most important one in contemporary discussions of system
development.
While the measurement of permanent partial disability involves
problems in the calculation of lump sums as well as periodic payments,
the focus of this article is on the calculation of periodic payments. In
contemporary debate, this is important in at least three contexts.
First, in relation to tort liability, there is increasing recognition of
the difficulties of lump sum awards and of the potential advantages of
switching to periodic payments, perhaps in the context of other struc-
tural changes. For example, Dickson J., speaking for the Supreme
Court of Canada, has said:
The subject of damages for personal injury is an area of the law which cries out
for legislative reform. The expenditure of time and money in the determination
of fault and of damage is prodigal. The disparity resulting from lack of provision
for victims who cannot establish fault must be disturbing. When it is determined
that compensation is to be made, it is highly irrational to be tied to a lump-sum
system and a once-and-for-all award.
© Copyright, 1985, Terence G. Ison.
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The lump sum award presents problems of great importance. It is subject to
inflation, it is subject to fluctuation on investment, income from it is subject to
tax. After judgment new needs of the plaintiff arise and present needs are extin-
guished; yet, our law of damages knows nothing of periodic payment. The diffi-
culties are greatest when there is a continuing need for intensive and expensive
care and a long-term loss of earning capacity. It should be possible to devise
some system whereby payments would be subject to periodic review and variation
in light of the continuing needs of the injured person and the cost of meeting
those needs.1
Secondly, in workers' compensation in recent years, some prov-
inces have abandoned the award of fixed pensions and reverted to peri-
odic payments calculated by reference to the estimated actual loss of
earnings of the worker as assessed from time to time (coupled with
initial lump sums).
Thirdly, it has been argued that all etiologically-based systems, in-
cluding tort liability and workers' compensation, should be abolished in
favour of a comprehensive plan of compensation for disablement.2 In
that context, too, problems of measurement arise in relation to periodic
payments, particularly for permanent partial disability.3
Periodic payments have obvious advantages over lump sums as
compensation for certain types of loss, particularly loss of future earn-
ings and future expenses resulting from the disability. For example, pe-
riodic payments avoid the problem of calculating a lump sum by refer-
ence to an expectation of life which almost inevitably will differ,
sometimes by many years, from the actual life of the claimant. The
purpose of this article, however, is not to demonstrate the advantages of
periodic payments over lump sums. Rather it is to discuss the alterna-
tive ways in which periodic payments might be measured when used as
compensation for loss of future earnings or for loss of earning capacity.
Other types of loss do not usually involve the same problems. In
our current system of workers' compensation, for example, ongoing pro-
vision for medical and other future costs of disablement is necessary
only in a minority of cases and is not usually a matter of great diffi-
culty. Irregular and occasional costs can be met as required on an ac-
tual cost basis. Regular ongoing costs can be met by paying a regular
allowance, either indexed for inflation or adjusted when actual costs
change.
Traditionally, the greatest problem has been to design a satisfac-
1 Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 236; 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452
at 458.
2 For example, Ison, "Human Disability and Personal Income" in Kar, ed. Studies In Cana-
dian Tort Law (1977) 425.
3 Id. at 432..
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tory method of calculating periodic payments for loss of earnings or
earning capacity.
FIXED PENSION OR ACTUAL LOSS OF EARNINGS
The primary choice is between
(a) the establishment of fixed pension, or
(b) the actual loss of earnings method; that is, attempting to
make periodic payments, the amounts of which will vary
from time to time, or at pre-determined intervals, according
to changes in the estimated actual loss of earnings resulting
from the residual disability.
Both methods have been used in workers' compensation in Canada
from its earliest years, though the actual loss of earnings method has
generally been abandoned when its difficulties and injustices have been
re-discovered. A fixed pension is the method that has generally been
accepted in royal commission studies4 and that has traditionally been
used by the workers' compensation boards most of the time. In recent
years, however, the actual loss of earnings method has been revived in
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick. The difficulties of this method are
explained under the headings that follow.
ADJUDICATIVE PROBLEMS
The actual loss of earnings method has a superficial attraction: it
would appear to keep the compensation in line with actual economic
loss. This is, however, an illusion.
All methods of measurement require a workers' compensation
board to determine whether the current disablement of a worker is a
consequence of the compensable disability or a consequence of other
causes, pre-existing, concurrent or subsequent. Under a pension system,
this is determined only once, unless a worker applies subsequently for a
re-opening on the ground that the condition has deteriorated. Under an
actual loss of earnings method, however, the question of whether the
current disablement is a consequence of the compensable disability is
subject to constant or periodic review; and of course the decisions be-
come increasingly difficult as the consequences of the compensable dis-
ability blend with subsequent events affecting the health of the claim-
ant, including subsequent diseases, subsequent trauma and natural
aging. Thus the problems involved in establishing etiology are not con-
4 The best of these was probably the B.C. Report of the Royal Commission on the Work-
men's Compensation Act and Board, (1952).
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fined to the decisions made in the early stages of a claim. They can
beset a claim throughout the ensuing years.
Under an actual loss of earnings method, there is scope for contin-
uing disputes not only about the significance of the compensable injury
or disease as a cause of the current disablement, but also about the
current disablement as a cause of absence from work. No disability
exists as an isolated condition superimposed upon a state of normalcy.
Every serious disability interacts with a range of physical, emotional,
intellectual and social characteristics that combine, in ways that are
never completely obvious, to determine fitness for work. Moreover, the
current state of the economy, and of the labour market in particular,
can be critical in the availability of work; but, again, its significance in
a particular case at a particular time, compared with the personal char-
acteristics of the worker, may well be obscure.
There would be no problem if each claim involved a discrete disa-
bility superimposed upon a state of normalcy and if the claimant would
subsequently age at a standard rate with no other health problems, and
if the labour market would remain static; but that is not the real world.
Establishing etiology on a continuing or periodic basis can be extremely
difficult and it can be even more difficult to establish the etiological
significance of one past disability on the current labour market oppor-
tunities of a claimant. The evidentiary basis for the conclusions, and
the roles of law, fact, medicine and logic would be so slight, compared
with the range of intuitive judgments being made, that the decisions
must have the appearance of whim, or open-ended discretion, or as re-
sulting from prejudice or pressure.
In some cases it may be easy to determine that a current incapac-
ity for work is due to multiple causes, perhaps several disabilities, the
compensable disability being one. How much loss of earnings is to be
attributed to that cause, however, can still be a contentious issue.
Another relevant factor is that the easiest claimants to place in
employment are those whose disabilities are apparent, such as ampu-
tees. The most difficult ones to place are the bad back patients. Yet this
is the category of claims that is also the most controversial, and it is in
the bad back cases that the greatest pressure arises to close the files.
Thus if an actual loss of earnings method was operating according to
its own rules, compensation benefits would tend to terminate for claims
that are not generally controversial, while continuing benefits would be
claimed for the category of claims that is the most highly controversial.
Even if it could be done in any fair and accurate way, the continu-
ing or periodic review of a disability, its labour market significance,
and its etiology would still involve a high administrative cost to com-
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pensation ratio.
Some of the difficulties and complexities of adjudication under an
actual loss of earnings method can be mitigated by a process of negoti-
ation and bargaining to achieve a conclusion that the claimant can be
persuaded to accept. If that happens, however, it puts a premium on an
aggressive temperament and penalizes people of modest dispositions. It
is particularly objectionable to engage in a process of that kind with
someone whose self-confidence may have been shaken by disablement,
and in any event, bargaining can be a negative influence on rehabilita-
tion. Moreover, bargaining is a way of resolving differences between
adversaries. For bargaining to take place between a claimant and an
adjudicating tribunal is a serious impairment of the right to adjudica-
tion. Our system of workers' compensation was introduced in the first
place to save disabled workers from the bargaining process, and any re-
introduction of that by the adjudicating tribunal would undermine the
perception of workers' compensation as a system of insured statutory
rights.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
A major advantage of a fixed pension is its positive influence on
rehabilitation. However much a claimant may be able to improve his
future earnings, the pension remains unaffected. Conversely, to base
compensation on actual loss of earnings creates a significant disincen-
tive to work. There could be no benefit from work unless the antici-
pated earnings are substantially in excess of the compensation. In most
cases, that would not be so. The traditional response to this, and the
one adopted in the recent reversion to the actual loss of earnings
method, is to calculate the current earnings of the claimant by includ-
ing not only actual earnings, but also the earnings that could be ob-
tained by the claimant in some suitable occupation. This use of
"deemed earnings" has been one of the greatest causes of anger and
complaint in the history of workers' compensation.
One consequence of the use of "deemed earnings" is that rehabili-
tation is no longer voluntary. The claimant is under considerable pres-
sure to accept a job offer, particularly if it is one recommended by a
board. Thus, to the adjudicative problems of this method, there is
added a structure that will produce, in some cases, a form of directed
labour. There are, moreover, other encroachments on civil liberties in
the use of this method. One is that the position of a claimant, including
his medical condition, work, work opportunities, place of residence and
other aspects of the claimant's lifestyle, are subject to continuing or
19841
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periodic investigations by the board. It is like a sentence of perpetual
probation.
This method also requires continuing participation by a board in
the doctor/patient relationship. Under other methods, once a pension is
assessed, a board no longer requires continuing reports from the attend-
ing physician and the confidentiality of the doctor/patient relationship
is restored. Under the actual loss of earnings method, however, there
may be a continuing or periodic need for information from an attend-
ing physician to enable a board to determine whether any current loss
of earnings is due to the compensable disability or to other causes.
The actual loss of earnings method is also inconsistent with con-
temporary demands of the civil rights movement among disabled peo-
ple. They want more entrenched rights and less administrative discre-
tion, more law and less medicine, more independence and fewer
dependency relationships which subject their social and economic activ-
ities and their lifestyles to the continual judgments of other people.
Another civil liberties issue is the threat to the basic right of move-
ment. A right which we claim distinguishes the "free world" from to-
talitarian regimes is the right to travel, including the right to leave the
country of one's birth or domicil and settle or re-settle elsewhere. A
fixed pension system enables disabled people to stay where they are or
go to the places of their choice without fearing a loss of compensation
payments. The actual loss of earnings method can generate a fear in
claimants that if they are not present and available for continuing or
periodic reviews of their entitlement, with local evidence of their efforts
to work, their benefits will be reduced or terminated. Whatever the re-
ality may be about the decisions likely to be made when someone has
left the jurisdiction, the fear created of adverse consequences can be a
serious restraint on the right to move. For this reason alone, this
method is hardly consistent with the principles enunciated in the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'
In Canada, this is not merely a theoretical problem. A large pro-
portion of workers in high hazard industries are immigrants, and it is
not unusual for a disabled immigrant to want to return to his country
of origin, particularly if he will have family support there. This re-
straint upon civil liberties could, therefore, be substantial.
INFLUENCE ON REHABILITATION
A primary goal in the measurement of partial disability must
5 Sections 6, 7 and 15.
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surely be to avoid any significant impediment to rehabilitation. Indeed,
one of the reasons for compensating for partial disability at all is to
avoid such an impediment. As mentioned above, some systems of social
insurance and many insurance company policies of disability insurance
compensate only for total disability. Thus any marginal improvement
that a claimant can achieve in his condition may be a disqualification
from all further benefits. Compensation for partial disability should be
designed to remove that obstacle to rehabilitation as well as other
impediments.
A fixed pension for permanent partial disability creates the maxi-
mum incentive to rehabilitation once a pension has been assessed.
Claimants are told that pensions are payable for life, or at least until
retirement age. They can do what they like, go where they like, earn as
much as they can, embark on any career changes they wish, adopt any
lifestyle of their choice, and nothing that they do will be called into
question to impair the continuity of the pension. By contrast, the actual
loss of earnings method negates the advantage to disabled people of re-
establishing themselves in employment. It also constrains their liberty
to make other decisions relating to their own rehabilitation according to
their own choices.
This method can also create genuine fears of work. This was
brought home to the writer in an interview with a paraplegic claimant
in New Zealand who was receiving compensation on an actual loss of
earnings basis. Apart from his paralysis, he seemed healthy. When
asked why he had no plans for work he explained, after some reluc-
tance, his fear. He was apprehensive that if he returned to work and
then found after some period that he was unable to continue, his subse-
quent absence from work might be attributed to some cause other than
his compensable disability, perhaps a debilitating disease, the aging
process, et cetera. An attempt to work with temporary success may be
construed as evidence of an ongoing capacity to work, and any subse-
quent discontinuance of work may therefore be attributed to causes
other than the compensable disability. Thus his fear of work reflected
his recognition that any subsequent resumption of compensation bene-
fits would depend upon judgmental factors, and he would be cast in a
role similar to that of a suppliant for the exercise of a discretion.
Fears of this kind can be aggravated by recognition that compen-
sation systems are, and always have been, subject to political pressures.
The treatment of disabled people has varied with the ebbs and flows of
the political process, and it would surprise no-one if the outcome of the
various intuitive judgments involved in the actual loss of earnings
method should vary with the political climate of the times. For that
1984]
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reason too, any reversion to this method means that a disabled person
loses the secured position of a pensioner only to obtain instead a posi-
tion of vulnerability to the winds of political change.
Vested pension rights that are not dependent upon subsequent
events not only maximize the incentive to rehabilitation but also pro-
mote the security and confidence that are likely to make rehabilitation
successful. Conversely, uncertainty about future compensation benefits
can maximize anxiety, which in turn can increase the severity of dis-
ablement. Moreover, uncertainty, coupled with the recognition that fu-
ture benefits will depend upon a range of judgmental factors, may tend
to divert some people from rehabilitation and create instead a perceived
need to be more convincing about the nature and extent of their disa-
bilities. Even among ordinary claimants, it can create an incentive to
exaggerate their woes.
Another more serious aspect of the actual loss of earnings method
is its incompatibility with the existence of a genuine and active rehabil-
itation service. Indeed, the actual loss of earnings method is incompati-
ble with rehabilitation as a service that is offered to claimants. Where
benefits are reduced if the employment efforts of a claimant are suc-
cessful, and may also be reduced by reference to "deemed earnings",
rehabilitation consultants are bound to be perceived as benefit control
officers, and rehabilitation is almost bound to become a euphemism for
a system of imposed controls. This is another negative influence on the
confidence of claimants that is so necessary for constructive and imagi-
native rehabilitation programmes.
Again, good rehabilitation can sometimes require personality and
aptitude testing, often concurrently with treatment at a board clinic.
On an actual loss of earnings system there would be suspicions that the
results of such tests could become part of the evidence used for a termi-
nation of benefits. Moreover, confidence in the medical and rehabilita-
tion staff would tend to be undermined by fears that they are not there
to promote the patient's interests, but rather to prepare a case against
the patient by the provision of evidence relating to earning capacity in
some "suitable employment". Suspicions about the genuineness of a re-
habilitation service are likely to be enhanced if it is board policy to
follow clinical testing by requiring or monitoring routine job search ef-
forts by claimants. That debilitating practice has already been used,
and its use is surely likely to be extended under an actual loss of earn-
ings method.
The provision of a real and genuine rehabilitation service is de-
manding. It requires a high level of intelligence and imagination among
the staff, and it requires primarily field-work. People of the calibre re-
[VOL, 22, No. 4
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quired for a genuine, imaginative and constructive rehabilitation ser-
vice are unlikely to remain in the job, or unlikely to be hired, if the job
is perceived as essentially one of benefit control. The rehabilitation divi-
sion of a board is almost bound to take on a paramilitary flavour, with
supervision over claimants being the perceived role.
Again, when the role of a rehabilitation consultant at a board is so
directly related to the reduction of claims costs, a claimant can have no
confidence that the consultant is turning his mind objectively to the
question of what career pattern would best suit the long term interests
of the claimant, and hence no confidence that advice as to suitable em-
ployment is in the best interests of the claimant.
These problems are bound to aggravate the difficulties of quality
control. The nature of a rehabilitation service makes it extremely diffi-
cult to measure success, to monitor performance and to maintain qual-
ity. There is no valid quantitive measure of success and no bottom line.
There has, however, been one traditional mode of quality control; i.e.,
the market mechanism of free choice. Under a fixed pension system, a
claimant can accept or decline the rehabilitation services of a compen-
sation board according to his choice. This right of choice is the primary
medium of quality control. In an actual loss of earnings system, includ-
ing the provision for "deemed earnings" in some "suitable employ-
ment", this right of free choice is gone, and there is no other automatic
control for professional quality. If any resulting deterioration in the
quality of rehabilitation combines with other pressures operating on the
system under an actual loss of earnings method, the temptations and
the pressures will be there in any case where rehabilitation is difficult
to identify a "suitable employment", deem the earnings, and close the
file.
SIGNIFICANCE FOR EMPLOYERS
The negative impact of the actual loss of earnings method on dis-
abled people and the problems that it creates for an adjudicating board
are not counter-balanced by any clear advantages for employers. A re-
version to the actual loss of earnings method might result in a net re-
duction in claims costs, and if it does, a consequential downward influ-
ence on assessment rates could seem attractive, at least at first
impression. If this occurs, however, there are several reasons why it
could turn out to be less attractive than it might first appear.
One is that any resulting reduction in the cost of workers' compen-
sation claims could be offset to some extent by consequential increases
in the costs to employers of sick pay and disability insurance, and in
costs to taxpayers at large (including employers) through Unemploy-
19841
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ment Insurance, Canada or Quebec Pension plans, welfare, et cetera.
Moreover, the anxieties and stress created for disabled people by the
actual loss of earnings method might aggravate their disabilities, with
resulting increases in costs. At the very least, any reduction in claims
costs would be offset in part by the increase in administrative costs
required to operate an actual loss of earnings system.
This last point is not a small one. The palliative that is offered to
make an actual loss of earnings method acceptable in the political pro-
cess is that it operates in conjunction with a lump sum payment. Thus
the problems outlined above may begin at a time when a claimant has
the funds to engage a lawyer. It would be no surprise if the combina-
tion of lump sums and the actual loss of earnings method results in a
gradual increase in the use of lawyers, with a partial return to the costs
and other problems of the adversary system.
Again, the actual loss of earnings method is difficult to reconcile
with a funded system. If there is no fixed pension, there is no mathe-
matical way of estimating the future costs of a claim for funding pur-
poses. One solution would be to move from funding to current cost fi-
nancing. That is something that should probably be done in any event,
and as a practical matter, it has almost been done in Ontario. However,
the combined effect of current cost financing together with an actual
loss of earnings system could be unfortunate. The result would be that
if workers really do receive the benefits to which they would be entitled
under the system, then when the economy is down, costs would sud-
denly increase in respect of past claims. Hence assessments would have
to be increased at a time when the increase would create the maximum
difficulty for employers.
Another concern is the impact that this regime could have on the
overall state of labour relations. The recent downturn in the economy
and the consequential unemployment have created great strains for
many people and for many companies. Constructive solutions to these
problems may depend upon some measure of cooperation, and this is
surely less likely to occur if hostile positions are adopted. The actual
loss of earnings method may appear simply as an attempt to save
money by a system change that is inimical to the interests of disabled
people. This is all the more unfortunate if it is adopted when alterna-
tive methods of saving money6 are available which would not adversely
affect the interests of disabled people.
Another matter of possible concern to employers is that the actual
' E.g. adopting current cost financing; and adopting a comprehensive plan of compensation
for disablement instead of the present fragmented systems.
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loss of earnings method is likely to result in more compensation to
those claimants who are generally considered by employers to be the
least deserving, particularly the bad back cases, with less going to those
categories of disabled workers who are generally regarded by employ-
ers as the most deserving, for example, the amputees.
Again, actual loss of earnings systems or proposals have sometimes
been associated with pressures and obligations upon employers to pro-
vide continued employment to workers who are disabled in their ser-
vice, even though such workers may not be wanted for what they can
now produce. The result could be that conscientious and law-abiding
employers comply with the obligation and provide continued employ-
ment, notwithstanding the economic disadvantage of doing so, while
more reckless or indifferent employers find ways of avoiding the obliga-
tion. Such obligations are notoriously difficult to police. The net result
may well be that conscientious employers are placed at a competitive
disadvantage.
A final concern for employers must surely be the long-term impact
on costs. If the short-term result of a reversion to the actual loss of
earnings method is a reduction in costs (and I am not sure that it is),
the long-term impact could well be a substantial cost increase. This is
because a reversion to the actual loss of earnings method is likely to
result in such a serious deterioration in the system from a worker's
perspective that within a relatively short time there could be demands
for a revival of tort liability in addition to workers' compensation.
Those demands would be hard to resist when it is seen that among
seriously disabled people, the compensation received by those disabled
as a result of employment compares so unfavourably with that received
by those disabled in some other ways. While these demands for a revi-
val of tort liability might originate in the labour movement, or with
labour lawyers, they could soon find powerful support from the insur-
ance industry and the litigation bar. The end result could be that em-
ployers are paying liability insurance premiums in addition to workers'
compensation assessments, and the overall impact on cost could be such
an escalation that employers look back with nostalgic envy to the as-
sessment rates of 1985.
SIGNIFICANCE FOR TAXPAYERS
Our systems of workers' compensation were designed from the be-
ginning to protect taxpayers as well as to protect disabled workers and
employers. The principle adopted was that society should pay for indus-
trial disabilities but should not pay twice for the same disability. A
disabled worker should not receive a lump sum which he could then
1984]
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spend and become a charge on public funds. It was partly for this rea-
son that the use of lump sums was discontinued (except for minor disa-
bilities) in favour of fixed pensions. In the recent revival of the actual
loss of earnings method, however, it has been combined with the re-
introduction of an initial lump sum. Because the actual loss of earnings
method does not guarantee further income (for the reasons explained
above), this revival could involve the kind of double burden on society
that the abolition of lump sums was originally intended to avoid.
THE PROCESS OF SYSTEM REVISION
The actual loss of earnings method was, of course, known to those
who conducted the royal commissions of earlier years and to board ad-
ministrators. It was rejected in preference for fixed pensions. This pref-
erence rested upon a sound analysis, and it included a conscious accept-
ance of the weaknesses of a pension system. Nothing of any real
relevance has changed since that judgment was made. What has
changed, and what appears to have led to the revival of the actual loss
of earnings method, is that the decision-making processes have become
less thorough, less analytical, less advertent to long-term consequences
and more responsive to the political pragmatism of the moment.
A royal commission has several advantages. The evidence and the
arguments are in the open, and nowadays, a royal commission can aug-
ment the submissions received by work of its own research staff. It is,
or at least might be, relatively immune from the pressures of the politi-
cal process. Those pressures can operate subsequently on the political
decisions made in response to the report, but they might not operate
from the beginning to detract from the fact finding and analytical
work. Again, royal commissions are generally conducted by people en-
gaged in the work on a full-time basis.
Conversely, legislative committees, task forces, consulting firms
and other types of enquiry often have their work conducted by people
who are subject to the concurrent distraction of other demands. This
problem is aggravated if the people concerned have no prior experience
of the system that they plan to change. Those types of enquiry can be
useful for a range of purposes, but for major revisions of system struc-
ture, a more penetrating analysis is essential.
Short-sighted answers are bound to follow from short-sighted methods of exami-
nation. It is even worse if the sweep and philosophy and the broad purposes of
such a project are ignored in favour of the sheer pragmatism of the moment.7
Woodhouse, Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme, (1979) Kennedy Elliott Me-
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Unfortunately, that warning has been unheeded in the revision of work-
ers' compensation in Canada during the last few years.
An example of this, which subsequently became typical, is that
when the committee report in Saskatchewan recommended the actual
loss of earnings method in 1978, they appeared to be acting in the hon-
est belief that they had thought of something new and progressive.8
There was no recognition in the report that this method had been tried
before in Canada, even in the neighbouring province of Manitoba a
decade or so previously.
THE EXPERIENCE TO DATE
No doubt it would be of interest to know how the actual loss of
earnings method has worked since it was revived in Saskatchewan and
New Brunswick, but we probably never will, at least not in terms of a
complete picture. Most of the relevant impacts of the system are not
systematically recorded; there is no vantage point from which to see the
full range of consequences and there has been no systematic empirical
study.
For several reasons, however, one might expect this method to
work better in Saskatchewan (which has had the longest experience
with the recent revival) than it could work in the larger provinces. Sas-
katchewan was extremely fortunate in the ability and integrity of the
person who was Chairman of the Board during the introductory years
of the recent revival of this method, and one would expect him to make
the system operate as well as possible. It would be unrealistic to expect
that level of ability and authority among all primary adjudicators and
at all levels of appeal in the larger provinces.
Secondly, the population of disabled workers in Saskatchewan is
relatively small. The number of serious and permanent disabilities in-
volving a significant issue is small enough for one person to be responsi-
ble for adjudication in relation to them all, and the chairman can also
maintain a personal familiarity with what is happening in primary ad-
judication. This volume limitation can help to promote consistency, and
it can also facilitate the use of judgmental factors without fixed rules.
The volume is too great for that in the larger provinces. The continuing
or periodic reviews required by the actual loss of earnings method in a
larger province would have to be conducted, and the decisions would
have to be made by a variety of staff, and it would be extremely diffi-
morial Lecture to the Medico-Legal Society of Wellington, at 4.
8 Sask., Report of the Workers' Compensation Act Review Committee, (1978).
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cult to achieve consistency in the application of the judgmental vari-
ables. One result would be further congestion of the appeal structures,
some of which are already overloaded.
Another significance of volume is that in a smaller jurisdiction, the
method could operate for a long time without adverse comparisons be-
ing made with tort liability. Consider the example of two clerical work-
ers, both suffering accidents in which they became paraplegics. In one
case it happened at work and in the other case it happened while
travelling home. Both are able to return to the same or similar employ-
ment. In the first case, the worker in Saskatchewan would receive tem-
porary workers' compensation benefits and a relatively small lump sum.
In the second case, the worker would receive periodic payments under
automobile insurance, and if he sues on a tort claim may receive an
award of about half a million dollars. Can anyone seriously expect or-
ganized labour to acquiesce in the actual loss of earnings method when
comparisons of that type become headline news? In Saskatchewan, sev-
eral years could go by before comparative accidents of that kind occur
and the results become known. In Ontario, it could be only a matter of
weeks. Any adoption of the actual loss of earnings method in the larger
provinces could, therefore, create a serious risk of a demand for work-
ers' compensation to be supplemefited by tort liability. That could have
its advantages for the insurance industry and the litigation bar, but it
would be unfortunate for disabled workers, for taxpayers and for
employers.
PENSION CALCULATIONS
Part of the pressure for a revival of the actual loss of earnings
method in recent years came from representatives of those who were
dissatisfied with their pensions. This dissatisfaction resulted, however,
not from the principle of a fixed pension but from the manner in which
pensions have been calculated. For the reasons explained above, a fixed
pension has substantial advantages over the payment of benefits by an
actual loss of earnings method.
The method of pension calculation generally used in Canada has
been the physical impairment method. This requires an injury to be
rated as a percentage of total disability according to the estimated de-
gree of functional impairment. To achieve consistency, the boards use
schedules of physical impairment which ascribe percentage rates to
particular disabilities. For example, in a typical schedule, total blind-
ness is rated at 100%, loss of a kidney at 15%, immobility of the joint
at the hip at 30%, complete denervation at the elbow of the median
nerve at 40%, total immobility of the spine at 60%, shortening of leg 6y
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two inches at 6%, and amputation of an upper extremity at the middle
third of the humerus at 65%. In British Columbia, these percentage
rates are then adjusted by an age variable. The percentage rate thus
ascertained is then applied to the rate of compensation that the claim-
ant would receive if totally disabled. Unscheduled disabilities are as-
sessed according to the same principles, using the schedule as a guide.
This method has had its problems. One is that the schedules of
physical impairment used by the compensation boards have been un-
duly orthopaedic. Thus the percentage rates for amputations seem un-
duly high when compared with physical impairment or likely economic
loss while the percentage rates attributed to diseases or to bad backs
seem unduly low. Thus while the theory has been that the percentage
rates are intended to reflect the degree of physical impairment, the
practice has been that they have tended to reflect anatomical loss. This
problem is, however, not .one that is inherent in the method. To a large
extent, it could be solved by drastic revision of the schedules.
Another and probably the main problem with the physical impair-
ment method is that it is difficult, almost to the point of being impossi-
ble, to incorporate any automatic occupational variable. In practice, an
occupational variable is not used in Canada or in most other jurisdic-
tions. Thus there is no necessary correlation between the degree of
physical impairment and the consequential economic loss. Perhaps the
example most favoured in academic discussion is that of a concert pian-
ist losing a finger. Of course the real world of human disablement does
not consist of concert pianists losing fingers, but it does include an
enormous volume of bad backs, and in workers' compensation, these
cases raise the majority of the problems in the measurement of periodic
payments for permanent partial disability.
Traditionally, the percentage rates ascribed to bad backs have
been low, typically in the range of 2 1/ to 5%. In some of these cases,
the ongoing loss of earnings resulting from the disability would be 50%
or higher. More recent years have seen bad backs typically rated at
10%, sometimes 15% or 20%, and in some cases at higher percentages.
If, however, the object is to bring the rate of pension more into line
with actual economic loss, this cannot be achieved simply by raising the
percentage rates. With bad backs in particular, there is no uniformity
in the economic significance to different people of the same back condi-
tion. For example, a bad back may result in the transfer of a skilled
manual worker to an unskilled sedentary occupation at half the rate of
pay, while for a sedentary worker, the same back condition may permit
continuation in his pre-injury occupation until retirement age with little
or no economic 16ss.
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An alternative, designed to cope with this problem, is the projected
loss of earnings method. This was introduced in British Columbia in
1973 in relation to bad back cases,9 and was subsequently extended to
some other cases of permanent disability.10 It is used concurrently with
the physical impairment method and the pension is based on the higher
of the two calculations. This method requires a forward projection of
the likely impact of the disability on future earnings. By reference to
that projection, a conclusion is reached about the impairment of earn-
ing capacity. Evidence is received about what the claimant is capable
of earning in occupations that are likely to be available to him, and
that level of earnings is compared (with adjustments for inflation) to
the pre-injury level of earnings.
This method is similar to the measurement of damages for loss of
future earnings on a tort claim except that there is no speculation
about what the earnings of the claimant would have been in the future
but for the disability. There is no speculation about what the future
prospects of promotion would have been, nor is there (as there is on
tort claims) any deduction for "contingencies". The Workers' Compen-
sation Board simply compares the likely future earnings of a claimant
after the disability with his pre-injury earnings. The pre-injury earn-
ings are, however, adjusted upward in certain cases, such as those in-
volving learners and apprentices who, at the time of injury, had not
reached what might be called the starting rate for their occupations.
This method avoids any attempt to vary the rate of benefit with
fluctuations in the level of actual earnings, and hence avoids most of
the problems of the actual loss of earnings method. While it is recog-
nized that in the long run, the predicted loss of earnings might differ
from the actual loss, this method regards that risk as a price worth
paying to avoid the problems of the actual loss of earnings method.
This risk of error is also mitigated in the Workers' Compensation Act
of British Columbia by a provision that permits the pension calcula-
tions to be re-opened on the application of the worker after ten years; 1
and of course they can be re-opened at any time on the application of
the worker in the event of a deterioration in the physical condition.
A possible objection to this method is that it does not provide com-
pensation for non-monetary losses. While the theory of workers' com-
pensation has been that benefits are payable for loss of earnings or of
earning capacity, the physical impairment method commonly results in
' Decision No. 8 (1973) 1 Workers' Compensation Reporter 27.
10 Decision No. 297 (1979) 5 Workers' Compensation Reporter 11.
n R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437, s. 24.
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pensions at a level exceeding these monetary losses, particularly in am-
putation cases. This excess might be regarded as compensation for non-
monetary losses.
In the context of a comprehensive plan (covering all disabilities
regardless of cause), this problem would take on added significance,
and indeed, a solution must be found to provide adequate compensation
for people, such as housewives, who may suffer significant disabilities
without measurable monetary loss.
Perhaps the optimum solution is a blended formula that would ar-
rive at a pension amount partly by reference to physical impairment
and partly by reference to the projected loss of earnings. This would
involve two calculations.
1. Physical Impairment Calculation
A revised physical impairment schedule could be used, showing
dollar amounts rather than percentage rates, so that the amounts
awarded would not vary with pre-injury earnings. For unlisted disabili-
ties, the schedule would be used as a guideline. An award under this
heading could be considered to cover:
(a) non-monetary losses - intangibles such as pain, suf-
fering, limitations on social activities, et cetera, and
(b) presumed loss of earning capacity - the prospect that
there may be some loss of earning capacity notwith-
standing the absence of any immediate measurable
loss. For example, a claimant may be able to return to
his pre-morbid occupation with the same employer, but
his prospects in the open labour market might be
prejudiced by the disability if he should lose that posi-
tion. Or the claimant might be a housewife who, in the
ordinary course of events, might have returned to an
earning position when the children left home.
2. Projected Loss of Earnings Calculation
This would provide the earnings-related portion of the pension,
and it could be expressed as a percentage of the projected loss of
earnings.
A politically sensitive question is whether these benefits should be
cumulative or alternative. To make them alternative would mean that
someone whose projected loss of earnings is substantial would receive
no compensation for non-monetary losses. Conversely, to make them
cumulative would evoke the objection that someone receiving substan-
tial compensation for projected loss of earnings would be receiving too
much in total. If that objection is met by reducing the amounts payable
for non-monetary losses, the complaint would be raised that those with
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no projected loss of earnings are receiving too little.
The optimum solution may well be to calculate the pension by ref-
erence to the larger of the two amounts, plus fifty per cent of the
smaller. This suggestion reflects:
(a) a political hunch that the provision of substantial com-
pensation for non-monetary losses is more acceptable
for claimants who are receiving no other benefit than it
would be for those who are receiving substantial com-
pensation for projected loss of earnings; and
(b) recognition that the physical impairment calculation
includes a component of presumed loss of earning ca-
pacity (non-measurable and non-demonstrable loss of
future earnings), and losses of this type are likely to be
greatest among those who are not receiving a benefit
for projected loss of earnings.
In the context of a workers' compensation system, a viable alterna-
tive would be to make the two benefits cumulative, and to set the cash
amounts of the first benefit, and the percentage rate of the second at
levels that would make this result acceptable. 12
The detail of this proposal would involve a measure of elaboration
that is beyond the scope of this article. There is no doubt, however, that
the proposal is administratively feasible.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the recent reversions to the actual loss
of earnings method are unfortunate. While the physical impairment
method has its problems, these can be overcome by a fixed pension cal-
culated through a blended formula that incorporates projected loss of
earnings together with the degree of physical impairment. Under any
method of calculation, the credibility of a fixed pension, including its
value in the alleviation of anxiety, requires that it must be indexed for
inflation.
The matters discussed in this article relate to questions of system
structure that are, at least within a very broad range, independent of
any judgment on the level of benefits. Under any system structure, the
levels of benefits will remain partly a matter of intuitive and political
judgment.
12 Neither of these formulae was adopted in British Columbia in 1973 because either would
have required legislative change, and it was desirable to obtain experience with the projected loss
of earnings method before undertaking any legislative change that would entrench its use.
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